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On the Impact of Quantitative Easing on Credit Standards and Systemic Risk:  
The Japanese Experience. 
Anh Nguyet Vu* 
 
Abstract 
This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of quantitative easing on credit standards 
and systemic risk in Japanese banks. Quantitative easing leads to softened credit standards of 
approving loan applications. Bank systemic risk, however, decreases following the expansion 
of asset purchase programs.  
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This paper presents empirical evidence on the latent repercussions of quantitative easing (QE) 
policy on financial intermediaries in Japan, contributing to the related macroeconomic 
literature (Matsuki et al., 2015). Under the expectation of ample liquidity and the insurance 
effect (Altunbas et al., 2014) via QE, banks tend to relax their lending attitude, also to facilitate 
the aim of QE in boosting lending to households and the nonfinancial sectors. Banks might 
lend to riskier borrowers to “search for yield” (Nucera et al., 2017). Because of low interest 
rates, asset prices and collateral value increase, resulting in banks issuing credit to firms with 
higher risk (Jiménez et al., 2014). In this accommodative environment, the principal-agent 
problem characterised by implicit government safety net and liquidity injection gives rise to 
greater bank risk taking (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). To the best of my knowledge, at the 
macro level, there is no empirical evidence on the impact of QE on bank credit standards of 
approving loan applications (CSs) in Japan for both QE periods (03/2001-03/2006 and from 
10/2010, when comprehensive monetary easing was reactivated, with quantitative and 
qualitative easing (QQE) starting in 04/2013). This paper attempts to fill this gap.  
As QE has been in effect in Japan over an extended period, its implications on bank systemic 
risk provide insights into its overall effectiveness. QE could increase systemic risk via the risk 
taking channel, the signalling channel and the portfolio effects (Colletaz et al., 2018; De Nicolò 
et al., 2010)1. Low interest rates make safe assets less attractive, pushing banks to invest in 
riskier ones. The increase in asset prices leads to higher value of equity, thus liberating risk 
budget and encouraging banks to engage in more positions. The fall in leverage could also 
result in banks increasing their demand for assets, inflating further the asset bubbles. However, 
if QE is effective in encouraging socially desirable risk taking (Lucas, 2014), facilitating higher 
                                               
1 See these papers for a comprehensive literature review. 
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income for households and businesses, we can expect lower default risk and greater financial 
stability. This study offers micro-level results on the effect of QE on bank systemic risk, 
extending Mamatzakis and Vu (2018) which partially addresses QE and nonperforming 
loans/bank stability.  
2. The model and data 
Following Maddaloni and Peydró (2011), I examine whether QE leads to an easing in CSs. A 
short-run Structural Vector Autoregressive model (SVAR) is employed: 
Α"Ι$ − Α&𝐿 − Α(𝐿( −⋯− Α*𝐿*+𝑦- = Α𝜖- = B𝑒-        (1) 
where: 𝑌- is a (𝑘 × 1) vector of quarterly (06/2000-12/2018) variables  (CSs, QE, the short-
term interest rate, and inflation and GDP growth as control variables)2, L is the lag operator, 
𝜖- is the original shocks with covariance matrix Σ, 𝑒- is a vector of orthogonalized disturbances 
with covariance matrix Ι$ . Identification is obtained by placing restrictions on matrices A and 
B. As monetary policy affects economic variables with a lag, and QE is enforced after low 
interest rates have been ineffective, the ordering is as follows: inflation, GDP growth, interest 
rates, QE, CSs. The focus is on CSs which are contemporaneously affected by shocks to other 
variables. CSs are diffusion indices of approving loan applications from large firms (CSLF), 
medium-sized firms (CSMF), small firms (CSSF), and households (CSHH). A positive 
(negative) value of the index denotes an easing (a tightening) in CSs.3 Five proxies of QE are 
used respectively: Bank of Japan’s assets, current account balances, reserves, Japanese 
                                               
2 I use the innovative outliers model Clemente et al. (1998) unit root test, allowing for two structural breaks. GDP 
growth and interest rates are I(0), QE is I(2), the rest is I(1). 
3 Details about the index are available on the Bank of Japan’s website.  
 4 
government bonds, and the amount of asset holdings (commercial papers, corporate bonds, 
bills purchased (till July 2006), and Japanese government securities).4 
I employ instrumental-variables models (2) to examine the impact of QE on systemic risk at 
the bank level with semi-annual data:  
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘A,- = 𝑓"𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘A,-D&, 𝑄𝐸A,-D&, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒A,-D&, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙A,-D&+ + 𝜀A,- 
            (2) 
where Control is a vector of bank-specific variables which are competition (the bank-level 
Boone indicator5), capitalisation (capital/assets), asset diversification (securities/assets), and 
performance (cost/income). The model addresses endogeneity concerns between competition, 
interest rates, and QE (Leroy and Lucotte, 2015; Mamatzakis and Vu, 2018). There are 4,654 
observations of Japanese banks (10 City Banks, 65 Regional Banks I, 56 Regional Banks II, 
17 Trust Banks6) from 2000 to the first half of 2018 (financial years).  
Systemic risk is proxied by SRISK, “the expected capital shortfall of a financial firm in a 
systemic crisis where the broad market index falls by more than 40% in a six-month period” 
(Acharya et al., 2017), available at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/.7 As the majority of 
banks are private, I also use size (the share of the bank assets in total assets) as another measure 
of systemic risk (Basel, 2013; Varotto and Zhao, 2018). 
  
                                               
4 Due to space constraints, I select the model specifications that produce many significant parameters to report 
results. All results are available upon request. 
5 The methodology is as reported in Mamatzakis and Vu (2018). The generalized cross validation method indicates 
a=0.23. 
6 For simplicity, Trust Banks, long-term credit banks and others are referred as one category which is Trust Banks. 
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3. Results 
3.1. QE and credit standards 
Figures 1 and 2 display the trend of CSs and QE. CSs were more relaxed in the first QE 
timeframe (03/2001-03/2006), when the amount of asset purchases was significantly less than 
that in the second phase (since 2010).  
Figure 1. Quarterly Credit Standards 
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Table 1 reports the SVAR results for the impact of QE on CSLF, CSMF, CSSF, CSHH, 
respectively. The impulse response functions for CSs are depicted in Figure 3, and variance 
decompositions are reported in Table 2. The models allow for a maximum of 8 lags and account 
for structural breaks. The results show a significant effect of QE in relaxing CSs, with stronger 
magnitude on CSLF and CSHH. Reducing short-term interest rates leads to softened CSMF, 
in line with findings of Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) for banks in the Eurozone. However, 
CSLF appears to be tightened following low rates, which could imply that banks, being aware 
of the potential risks associated with low rates, could indeed be more cautious in granting loans 
to large firms. On GDP growth, the findings suggest that banks tend to relax lending standards 
and expand credit in good times (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). CSLF and CSHH being 
softened with higher inflation, in the Japanese case, could be to support the Bank to maintain 
the momentum of the economy heading towards the inflation target.8 Following Fukuda (2018), 
a dummy for the negative interest rate periods is included to capture its potential impact on 
banks behaving as risk takers overseas through more investments in Asian financial assets.9 
The results are very similar to the baseline SVAR models. 
  
                                               
8 See footnote 11. 
9 The author thanks an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
 7 
Table 1. SVAR-Credit standards of approving loan applications  
 
Impulse variable_Response variable 1 2 3 4 
Infl_CS 0.0173*** -0.0001 -0.0147 0.0077 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.016) (0.011) 
GDPg_CS 0.0132*** 0.0178*** -0.0033 0.0017 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Rate_CS 0.382*** -0.2642** -0.0565 0.0159 
 (0.157) (0.124) (0.148) (0.100) 
QE_CS 0.295*** 0.0709*** 0.0624* 0.2718** 
 (0.056) (0.020) (0.036) (0.135) 
Infl_GDPg -0.3464 -0.3446* -0.8942*** -0.2521 
 (0.215) (0.194) (0.286) (0.276) 
Infl_Rate 0.0091* 0.0302*** 0.0193 0.0104 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) 
GDPg_Rate 0.0036 0.0204*** 0.0191*** 0.0200*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Infl_QE -0.0202 -0.1036** -0.0683 -0.0525*** 
 (0.014) (0.048) (0.055) (0.009) 
GDPg_QE -0.029*** -0.0200 -0.0307 -0.0158*** 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.024) (0.004) 
Rate_QE 0.1615 1.4612** -0.3103 0.0130 
 (0.345) (0.734) (0.517) (0.095) 
CS CSLF CSMF CSSF CSHH 
QE_proxy AP reserves CAB JGB 
N 65 65 65 61 
R2 (CS equation) 0.8473 0.9147 0.9338 0.7904 
Notes: Infl: Inflation, I(1); GDPg: GDP growth, I(0); Rate: average overnight call rate, I(0); QE: I(2); CS: I(1). 
AP: asset purchases, CAB: current account balances, JGB: Japanese government bonds. Structural break dummies 
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Note: This figure corresponds to SVAR results in Table 1. Full IRFs are available upon request. 
 
 
Table 2. SVAR-Variance Decompositions 
 
Response variables Period Impulse variables 
Inflation GDPg Rate QE CSLF 
CSLF 4 0.0607 0.0294 0.0743 0.2293 0.6061 
8 0.0902 0.0422 0.0670 0.3238 0.4769 
CSMF 4 0.0546 0.2122 0.0694 0.1272 0.5365 
8 0.0548 0.2216 0.1201 0.1194 0.4841 
CSSF 4 0.0341 0.0759 0.1582 0.1209 0.6109 
8 0.0612 0.1245 0.1265 0.1492 0.5388 
CSHH 4 0.0625 0.0064 0.0447 0.1567 0.7297 
8 0.1032 0.1436 0.0357 0.1712 0.5463 
Note: This Table corresponds to SVAR results in Table 1. Full variance decompositions are available upon 
request.  
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3.2. QE and bank systemic risk 
Table 3 reveals that QE reduces systemic risk. Low interest rates, however, increase it. Overall, 
the effect of QE in facilitating macroeconomic conditions could be passed onto banks through 
lower default risk of firms and households (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the low interest rate environment may neutralise the benefits of QE by raising 
systemic risk via the risk-taking channel. As QE induces lax CSs which in turn could imply 
higher default risk, I also control for CSs in the model, together with a dummy for the negative 
interest rate periods (columns 2 and 4).10 The results confirm that lax CSs are associated with 
higher systemic risk (although with a small magnitude) and strengthen the literature (Jiménez 
et al., 2014). 
The negative impact of competition on systemic risk supports the competition-fragility 
hypothesis that Liu and Wilson (2013) report for all Japanese banks during 2000-2009. 
Diversification can help systemically important banks reduce their SRISK (column 1). On the 
accounting measure of performance, inefficient banks carry greater systemic risk.  
 
  
                                               
10 The author thanks an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 3. QE and systemic risk 
 
 1 2 3 4 
L.SRisk 0.9627*** 0.9616*** 0.8480*** 0.9731*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) 
L.QE -0.0566*** -0.0910** -0.0071** -0.0040*** 
 (0.013) (0.042) (0.003) (0.002) 
L.Boone -0.0550*** -0.0494** -0.0062** -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.003) (0.002) 
L.Rate -0.0307***  -0.0014**  
 (0.009)  (0.001)  
L.Capta -0.0099 -0.0345 -0.0004 0.0001 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.003) (0.002) 
L.Sectoa 0.0444** -0.0022 0.001 0.0005 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.Costinc -0.0104*** -0.0144*** -0.0009** -0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000)  
L.CS  0.0050**  0.0004** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  
negr  0.0023  0.0002 
  (0.003)  (0.000)  
depvar SRISK SRISK MSSR MSSR 
QE_proxy AP JGB BoJTA BoJTA 
N 807 806 4199 4198 
R2 0.9594 0.7698 0.9858 0.9888 
Notes: Instrumental variables regression with lags of endogenous covariates as instruments. Depvar: dependent 
variable, AP: asset purchases, JGB: Japanese government bonds, BoJTA: Bank of Japan’s total assets, CS: credit 
standards, negr: negative interest rates dummy, rate: average overnight call rate, Boone: the Boone indicator, 
capta: capital/assets, sectoa: securities/assets, costinc: cost/income. Based on panel unit root tests, QE and CS are 
I(1), in columns 1&2, rate and sectoa are I(1). Bank dummies are included; standard errors in parentheses. 
*,**,***: significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Systemic risk decreases corresponding to more powerful QE, supporting the Bank of Japan’s 
claim that no serious problem has been identified in the functioning of financial 
intermediation.11 Softened bank CSs, however, should be closely monitored to prevent 
unintended consequences of QE and greater systemic risk. 
 
                                               
11 Available at: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2018/ko180802a.htm/ 
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